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Healthcare for Migrants in Urban China: A New Frontier 
 
Carine Milcent
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Abstract 
How can healthcare access for Chinese migrants be improved? Migrant workers face two types of 
healthcare-access exclusion in the workplace: one is financial (because of their income) and the other 
is social (because of the lack of social networks in the city). We use 2006 data from a survey of rural 
migrant workers conducted in five of the most economically-advanced cities. The empirical findings 
support the hypothesis of a return to the hometown for migrant workers with poor health. Apart from 
residency permits and income, the social integration of migrant workers is also found to be a decisive 
factor in healthcare access.  
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Introduction 
 
The growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been accompanied by an expansion in 
healthcare expenditure. From under 3 percent of GDP in 1980, this grew to 5.3 percent in 
2000,
2
 increasing even more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. As the percentage of 
migrants in cities increases, their access to education and healthcare has become an 
increasingly central issue in China. Who has healthcare coverage? This paper proposes some 
answers by focusing on rural-urban migrant workers with formal jobs and in regular 
situations. 
On top of their existing 103 million urban migrants, Chinese cities continue to 
experience a steady migration inflow. In terms of health, one consequence is a falling 
proportion of the rural population living in extreme poverty, and improvements in the level of 
nutrition. Life expectancy at birth in 2010 was 74.51 years,
3
 which is eight years higher than 
the world average. As the disastrous famine in the late 1950s resulted in high mortality, the 
current life expectancy figure represents an enormous improvement within China. Other 
health indicators such as the infant mortality rate, the under-five mortality rate, and the 
maternal mortality rate have also registered improvements.
4
 
However, this expansion of healthcare is for the most part unequally distributed. 
Economic reforms have had positive effects on GDP and the level of nutrition, but have led to 
the collapse of the public healthcare network and universal access to basic healthcare. The 
result is an increase in healthcare inequality. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
periodically ranks countries according to the inequality of their healthcare systems, in 
particular their healthcare insurance system. According to the last WHO country 
classification, the Chinese health sector ranked close to the bottom in terms of the fairness of 
financial contributions. 
To help understand this deterioration, we here present a brief description of the 
healthcare-insurance system before the economic reforms and its subsequent evolution. In 
China, before the economic reforms, the healthcare-insurance system was not homogeneous. 
In urban areas, it depended on large state-owned enterprises (SOE) that took care of workers' 
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medical needs; healthcare in rural areas was determined locally. However, out-of-pocket 
expenses were close to zero, whatever the healthcare setup. 
In urban areas, the dismantling of the large state-owned enterprises (SOE) led to 
healthcare supplied by smaller-size units. These units quickly ran into difficulties financing 
their own social insurance. There are two main reasons for this: first, they were smaller than 
before, so the insurance pool was based on a smaller number of individuals; second, they 
were responsible for making a profit (with no intervention from the state), but part of that 
profit was used for social insurance. Facing the risk of collapse in the economic framework, 
the government was forced to react. It introduced a kind of social insurance with far lower 
coverage than before. In rural areas, farmers were themselves made responsible for social 
insurance through a pooling system at the village level. The rapid privatisation of farming was 
therefore disconnected from the financial burden of social insurance for rural inhabitants. 
Farms were not obliged to use part of their profits for social insurance, and there was 
therefore no risk of collapse for the agricultural sector. As such, the government did not have 
to step in to provide an insurance system for the rural population as it did for the urban 
population. The result was a degradation and sometimes complete disappearance of the 
healthcare-insurance system in rural areas. 
There is by now a large body of literature addressing the question of health inequality 
around the world.
5
 Various methods of analysis have been developed, some making use of 
advances in the literature on income distribution and taxation. Works have focused on 
individual countries as well as on comparing many different countries.
6
 In the case of China, 
however, there is very little literature. Bloom and Gu (1997)
7
 analyse the causes of increasing 
medical care costs and the deterioration of preventive programmes in some poor areas. Liu 
and Mills (2002)
8
 also focus on the reduction in demand for preventive services. A growing 
number of papers have considered the effect of the introduction of the New rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NCMS). Jackson et al. (2005)
9
 compare the introduction of NCMS with the 
out-of-pocket system in Henan Province. Wagstaff et al. (2009) also analyse the introduction 
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of the NCMS, but for different provinces in China, and provide an extensive review of this 
new literature. However, empirical studies on healthcare and migrants have attracted almost 
no attention in existing research. 
In this paper, we highlight migrants' healthcare exclusion due to both income and their 
lack of integration in the city. The household registration system (hukou) is interwoven with 
distribution of services and job opportunities. Most peasants who enter cities are not granted 
urban citizenship and are treated as "outsiders" to the urban society. The hukou system in fact 
also has consequences on the income effect. Hukou increases costs significantly, and 
represents a cost barrier to access equivalent to income loss. We shed light on the importance 
of both material and social capital, or life conditions, for migrant workers in providing greater 
access to healthcare. Above all, we provide new evidence on the decisive role of social 
networks on migrants’ healthcare access. Two pieces of work in sociology used qualitative 
methods to underline the effect of health on the decision to return home.
10
 Our empirical 
findings support the hypothesis of the return home for migrants with health problems. We are 
the first to highlight this pattern of exclusion using an empirical strategy and to emphasise the 
importance of social networks, the residence registration system, and the support of family 
and relatives as a factor in the outcome of treatment in compelling migrants to leave the city. 
In Section 2, we present the Chinese context. The description of the data and some 
preliminary statistics on migrants and healthcare are given Section 3. The econometric model 
is presented in Section 4. In sections 5 and 6, we present the first econometric results and 
explore migrants’ healthcare access depending on their health status. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
The Chinese context 
 
China's economic reforms have produced remarkable growth in GDP. This growth has been 
particularly concentrated in certain areas, mainly the major cities in the eastern and south-
eastern regions, leading to massive internal migration. 
Since the late 1970s, the economic take-off in some urban centres has created a huge 
demand for labour in these areas and triggered a wave of migration. The general GDP growth 
across the country led to rising labour demand at the local level in most areas, but much less 
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so than in these industrial centres.
11
 The forecast is that by 2020 more than 50 percent of 
China's total population will live in towns and cities. This implies that in coming years about 
three hundred million farmers will leave the rural areas. This will be the largest migration 
mankind has ever experienced. 
This internal migration raises a number of issues. One core issue in China is the 
conflict between the greater welfare associated with economic reforms and the deterioration 
of healthcare insurance. While economic reforms have had positive effects on GDP and the 
level of nutrition, they have also led to the collapse of both the public healthcare network and 
universal access to basic healthcare. The result has been an increase in healthcare inequality. 
There is another element that may also play a role in determining migrants' healthcare 
access and healthcare expenditure. In Chinese hospitals, family and relatives play a crucial 
role in the treatment and recovery process. Healthcare providers furnish only minimal 
accommodation and catering. When someone is in hospital, relatives must be present to 
support the patient through meals and help with their treatment. The presence of relatives also 
affects the way in which hospital staff treat the patient. The presence of family and relatives 
in the city can therefore also be a key component of healthcare access in the city. 
In theory, migrants are supposed to claim medical care benefits in the locations where 
they are registered. Even if most migrants do not have access to urban health insurance, some 
cities such as Shanghai have developed specific health insurance schemes for migrants. These 
local policies are increasingly common in China, but still cover only a small percentage of 
migrants, and the level of coverage is very low. Hence, the hukou system and the need for 
family support in hospitals push migrants to return to their place of registration. Sociological 
literature based on hometown surveys indicates this pattern. Health conditions that reduce the 
capacity to work (including old age, pregnancy, and recent childbirth) push migrants to return 
home to seek family support and to avoid the high medical and living costs in cities.
12
 To 
soften the distinction between the insured and the uninsured, we should underline that the 
level of coverage is often fairly low even for the insured. 
Leaving rural areas therefore does not produce urban dwellers. A survey conducted by 
Fudan University on 30,000 migrant workers in major Chinese cities revealed that only 7.6 
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percent of them are satisfied with their life in the city, and that 68 percent are convinced that 
the city will not accept their integration.
13
 
The healthcare system is organised such that hospitals capable of treating serious 
health conditions are found only in larger cities. For very severe health conditions, migrants 
can obtain some help from the local government in their place of work or from their 
employing firms. Migrants may thus prefer to stay in the city in order to obtain adequate 
healthcare. In this paper, we will therefore distinguish acute health problems from other types 
of disease or injury. 
 
Migrants in five big cities 
 
The survey on five cities 
We use data from the Survey of Rural Migrant Workers Health and Social-economic Status in 
2006. This survey was conducted by the National Population and Family Planning 
Commission of China and the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS). The sample is composed of 2,398 interviewees with health and social-
economic status information. The interviewees are rural-urban migrant workers. Rural-urban 
migrant workers are defined as workers who migrate from rural areas to cities. They come 
from rural areas and have rural hukou: they do not have permanent urban hukou from the 
place where they work. As noted above, the type of hukou has serious implications in terms of 
public service access, including health insurance. The rural-urban migrant workers were 
selected by their work units. This sample was constructed to be representative of rural-urban 
migrant workers with a formal job and in a regular situation. Therefore, this sample is 
composed of migrants in socio-economic situations that are called non-critical. The sample 
excludes migrants with informal jobs and self-employed migrant workers. 
The survey covers fives cities: Chongqing, Dalian, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Wuhan. 
These five cities represent five of China's geographical regions, each with their own economic 
characteristics. All five of these cities have economic indices amongst the highest in the 
country and contain substantial numbers of rural migrant workers. Dalian represents 
Northeast China; Shanghai represents East China and is the economic hub of the country; 
Wuhan represents Central China; Shenzhen represents South China and is archetypal of the 
Pearl River Delta region, the biggest manufacturing base for exports; Chongqing represents 
                                                      
13
 “Most migrant workers in cities unhappy: Survey,” China Daily, 14 January 2008, http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/bizchina/2008-01/14/content_6391702.htm. 
 7 
Southwest China and is one of the biggest cities in the country; Northwest China is less 
developed and contains fewer rural migrant workers. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the sample characteristics. The average age is about 27 and there 
are no old people in the sample, which is typical of Chinese migrant characteristics. Migrants 
are younger in Dalian and Shenzhen than in the other three cities. On average, they are older 
in Shanghai and Chongqing. One explanation may come from the types of work in which 
migrants are employed. In Dalian, Wuhan, Shenzhen, and Chongqing, the sample mainly 
covers workers in industrial production lines, where jobs are better suited for younger 
workers. In Shanghai, the sample mainly comes from small companies and service industries 
where physical requirements may disqualify older migrants. The share of male and female 
workers is similar across cities. 
< Insert Table 1 > 
< Insert Table 2 > 
In China, compulsory education lasts for nine years. In most provinces, these nine 
years of education include six years of primary school (or elementary school) and three years 
of junior middle school. Most children start school at the age of seven. After junior middle 
school, they can choose to leave the education system. Beyond junior middle school there are 
three types of education: senior middle school (and then college after passing a national 
exam), vocational middle school, and technical middle school. Most migrants come into the 
labour market after graduating from junior middle school, and some join the labour market 
after graduating from vocational middle school or technical middle school; very few come 
into the labour market after graduating from high school. Dalian has the greatest variance in 
terms of the level of education, with the smallest percentage of elementary school migrants 
and the highest percentage of vocational middle school migrants. 
 
Health status 
Health in this survey is measured by questions on whether health reduces the capacity to 
work. This seems apt, as Chinese migrants often ignore health problems unless they affect 
their capacity to work. These questions were designed by Fan Ming (2002)
14
 to rank 
incapacity or injuries that limit migrant labour supply. Following Fan Ming (2002), a health 
indicator (Health1) is constructed from six objective health questions, of which five are 
Yes/No and the other is on a scale from one to five. The index is equal to the weighted sum of 
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these variables. Health1 gives information on health conditions limiting work, and takes 
values from 0 (very good health) to 30 (very poor health conditions limiting work). The 
questions and weights are shown in Table 3.  
< Insert Table 3 > 
Table 4 displays migrants’ health conditions. Globally, the population should be in 
good health, as young urban migrants are there to supply labour. In this survey, Wuhan is the 
city where migrants have the worst health, and Shanghai the city where migrants are in the 
best health, independent of the index that is analysed. 
< Insert Table 4 > 
 
Healthcare use 
In this paper, we have two sources of information on healthcare expenditure: healthcare 
expenditures in the last month and average healthcare expenditures per year. These come 
from information declared by the migrant herself. Healthcare expenditures over the last month 
are commonly used as an index of healthcare access. Here, however, the percentage of 
individuals with a positive value is very low, and the results using this variable are open to 
discussion.
15
 The second source of information has a number of advantages: the share of 
individuals declaring such healthcare expenditures is significant, and expenditure over a year 
is a more general measure of healthcare access. 
The health indices listed in Table 3 measure health conditions that limit the capacity to 
work. Therefore, a priori, all those who answered "Yes" to at least one of the questions should 
go to visit a doctor.
16
 Table 5 shows that only few of them actually do so. In the data, 61 
percent of individuals declare a positive average healthcare expenditure figure during the year 
in question. Dalian is the city where migrants have the least healthcare use. 
< Insert Table 5 > 
 
Health insurance 
Migrants have to claim for insurance reimbursement in the location where they are enrolled. 
Here, health insurance refers to subscribing to health insurance in the city of employment. 
This insurance is mainly subscribed to by the firm. The term “health insurance” excludes 
NCMS insurance, to which migrants subscribe in their hometown. 
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Table 5 shows that the level of insurance varies according to the city. While 80 
percent of migrants are insured in Dalian, in Chongqing only 18 percent of migrants are. In 
addition, healthcare use can depend on having health insurance. In Shanghai and Wuhan, 
insured individuals have more healthcare use than others do, while in Dalian, Wuhan, and 
Shenzhen insured individuals have less healthcare use than others. Therefore, the effect of 
insurance does not seem to be unambiguous. 
As noted above, there is no national-level health insurance system for migrant workers 
in China. Provincial governments and some city governments have their own policies 
regarding migrant health insurance. The five cities in our survey have their own health 
insurance systems according to local institutions. Specifically, Dalian and Shanghai provide 
health insurance for migrant workers, with a scheme different from the regular insurance 
systems for workers with urban hukou. In Shanghai, the government has a comprehensive 
social insurance system for migrant workers, including three types of insurance: health 
insurance, pensions, and work-related injury insurance. At the time of this survey, Shenzhen 
was in the process of setting up a health insurance system for migrant workers. Wuhan and 
Chongqing are different from the other three cities in having no health insurance system for 
migrant workers. However, migrant workers in these two cities, as well as in the three others, 
have the option of joining the health insurance system for city workers. There are two main 
benefits for migrant workers in subscribing to a migrant health insurance system rather than 
to a regular health insurance system. First, the fee for the city worker insurance system is 
higher than that for migrant health insurance; migrant workers, who earn less than city 
workers (on average) cannot necessarily afford the higher fee. Second, if a migrant worker 
participates in the city worker insurance scheme, she cannot then transfer her insurance 
benefits to other cities (or areas). However, we know that one of the key characteristics of 
Chinese migrant workers is that they frequently move. Migrants often retain links with their 
hometown through children, land rights, and so on. If they participate in one city's insurance 
scheme, they cannot subsequently transfer their insurance benefits to another location. 
 
Rural-to-urban migrants: Sample selection 
 
Estimation issues 
Who uses healthcare? We would like to measure healthcare access itself, i.e. the possibility of 
a migrant obtaining access to any form of healthcare. As we are not able to obtain a direct 
measure of healthcare access, we set up a proxy using the presence of healthcare expenditures 
 10 
during the year. When any healthcare expenditure is observed, we consider the migrant to 
have access to healthcare. HCA is a binary variable indicating whether the migrant has access 
to health care, i.e. had positive healthcare expenditure. We then identify the determinants of 
migrants’ health consumption by using a probit model. Since we can see from the preliminary 
statistics that the city has an effect on healthcare use, we also control the model for the city 
characteristic effects.
17
 Table 6 displays descriptive statistics for all the independent variables 
used in the estimations. 
< Insert Table 6 > 
In a second step, we focus on migrants who have health trouble. In the case of 
migrants who have a health trouble according to the Fan’s health index, we should observe 
use of healthcare. This is the definition of healthcare access given by Waters (2000).
18
 On a 
population where we should observe use of healthcare, the absence of healthcare consumption 
is interpreted as a healthcare access issue. When any healthcare expenditure is observed, we 
consider the migrant to have access to healthcare. The dummy variable for the presence of 
healthcare expenditure is then interpreted as healthcare access. In Waters’s paper, need for 
healthcare is defined by the self-reported health index. Need for healthcare is here measured 
by Fan's health index.  
If unmeasured variables that affect the outcome are also correlated with the migrant’s 
participation in health insurance (e.g. unobserved migrant characteristics), the results of the 
probit estimation are likely to be inconsistent. To ensure consistent estimates, we employ 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation by using instruments that are uncorrelated with 
unobserved individual characteristics but correlated with health insurance. The firm-size 
index is a good candidate as an instrument. Indeed, the migrant's participation in a health 
insurance program will depend on the firm's subscription to health insurance and other such 
characteristics of the firm. Controlling for industry (manufacturing, construction, or services), 
the size of the firm is plausibly uncorrelated with unobserved individual characteristics.
19
 
 
                                                      
17
 The Hausman test performed for each model (each column) supports the city fixed-effect assumption. The 
term “fixed effect probit model” is mainly used when individual fixed effects are considered. Our model can also 
be viewed as a probit model with city dummies. 
18
 Hugh R. Waters, “Measuring equity in access to health care,” Social Science and Medecine, 51(4), 2000, pp. 
599-612. 
19
 We also have information on firm ownership (state-owned firms, joint-venture firms, private Chinese firms, 
and foreign firms). However, these variables are not good candidates. Indeed, in China, firm ownership is 
correlated with healthcare access. State-owned firms often have agreements with certain hospitals (for instance, 
with military hospitals that are on average of better quality), independent of any participation in an insurance 
program.  
 11 
First empirical results 
In the following, we do not take hukou into account in the model, as all of the migrants in this 
survey are in the same situation: they do not have permanent hukou to work in the urban area. 
We show the results using the health index as defined by Fan (Health1). The health-status 
index is recoded into four groups: Very good health; Good/Fair health; Bad health and Very 
bad health. However, the results are qualitatively similar when we consider instead a vector of 
dummy variables for questions about health (as listed in Table 3). 
Table 7 displays the results from the econometric model. We find that migrant 
remittances increase healthcare use. This causality is surprising. Poor health induces higher 
medical expenditure and so less remittance. Indeed, migrants' remittances reduce their net 
income. We might then expect a negative effect on healthcare use due to lower income.  
< Insert Table 7 > 
Healthcare insurance has no positive and significant effect on healthcare use. 
Controlling only for demographic variables and the level of health, we find no effect of 
insurance on healthcare use, and when we control for income and migrants' remittances 
(Table 7, Column 5), we even obtain a negative significant effect. At first sight, this is 
worrying. The aim of healthcare insurance is to improve healthcare use. 
In Section 2, we explained the possibility of selection bias in the data due to inter alia 
legislative aspects (the hukou and its consequences). To test for selection bias is to test for 
migrant healthcare exclusion. However, having insurance does not mean being well covered. 
The level of coverage may differ according to the type of healthcare and the gravity of the 
illness. In China, the level of coverage is often low. Hence, as long as migrants consider their 
health condition as not being an issue for doing their job, they may ignore it. As the degree of 
gravity worsens, they react, which does not necessarily mean visiting a doctor in the location 
where they work; they can instead return to their hometown. They do so partly because in 
their hometown they benefit from family support, and partly also because they may benefit 
from health insurance there. Recall that public-insurance benefits can only be claimed in the 
locations where migrants are registered. Migrants are excluded from the health system 
program set up for urban citizens with the "right" hukou in their city of employment.
20
 
Because our survey is conducted in the workplace, these migrants will therefore not have 
been interviewed. 
                                                      
20
 As noted above, some works on rural areas suggest that migrants return to their hometowns when they need 
healthcare. Nansheng Bai and Yupeng He, “Huiliu haishi waichu-Anhui Sichuan ersheng nongcun waichu 
laodongli huiliu yanjiu,” art. cit., 2002; Z. Q. Zhang, Y. Zhou, S. X. Lu, and Y. H. Chen, “Return migration of 
rural labourer from Western China: Causes and strategies,” art. cit., 2007. 
 12 
While migrants may prefer to return to their hometown for more severe health 
conditions, there is another factor that may prevent migrants with poor health from leaving 
the cities. As described above, the Chinese health system is organised in such a way that 
hospital quality varies with the degree of urbanisation, with cities offering better quality 
healthcare. Given a certain degree of severity in a health condition,
21
 staying in the city may 
be a better option for migrants, as it gives them access to an adequate quality of healthcare. 
Moreover, the level of co-payment is not so low for more severe health conditions, as 
municipalities or firms where the migrants work may provide financial subsidies in this 
situation, regardless of hukou. 
We therefore propose two models dependant on the gravity of the health condition. As 
health indices do not capture lower degrees of severity, one model (Model A) considers 
migrants with health conditions that do not require high-quality healthcare, i.e. health 
conditions that do not require visiting a city hospital; the second model (Model B) considers 
migrants with more acute health conditions.
22
 We have no variable in hand to identify 
migrants who may eventually leave the city to deal with health problems. However, we know 
that there is potentially some subset of the population that is not present in our data due to 
incidental attrition. Comparing the results for migrants with different degrees of health 
problems allows us to examine the presence of selection bias. 
 
Healthcare use: A behaviour that depends on health status 
 
We present the results according to Fan's index.
23
 However, we may still have variations in 
health within a given level of this health index. We thus control for internal variations in 
health via the vector of the six variables for each of the six health questions in both Models A 
and B. However, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the vector in the regressions. 
Moreover, in this survey, health insurance subscription is decided by the firm. The results 
could therefore be affected by the non-exogeneity of the effect of health insurance on 
healthcare use. As explained above, we resolve this issue with instrumental-variable 
estimation. The results of such estimation are displayed in Column 6 of each Table. 
What about the potential non-exogeneous effect of NCMS insurance on healthcare use 
in the city? In China, the system of insurance is associated with one location. Migrants cannot 
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transfer insurance benefits to another location. Because the NCMS is associated with the 
hometown, NCMS subscription may have an effect on the decision to return to the hometown, 
but is not a substitute for the city insurance system. Because we focus on the city of 
employment (the place where the survey was conducted), the subscription to NCMS 
insurance should not be an issue here.
24
 
 
Migrants' exclusion from healthcare access 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 8 display the results of Model B. Regarding demographic variables, 
age is positively associated with healthcare access, and female migrants have better healthcare 
access than do men. To control for hardship of work, we include variables for industry and 
type of firm. Only working for a state-owned firm has an effect on healthcare use. Before the 
economic reforms, all those working in state-owned firms had complete healthcare coverage. 
The situation now is less clear, as this access has gradually deteriorated and migrants usually 
do not have access to this insurance. However, with the challenge of migrants' healthcare use, 
these firms are encouraged to facilitate healthcare access for migrants with more severe health 
conditions. The level of income acts as a push factor on healthcare use. The lower the income, 
the less likely the migrant is to use healthcare. The financial domain is then one determinant 
of migrants' exclusion from healthcare use. 
We here focus on more severe health conditions. The optimal behaviour is therefore to 
stay in the city in order to benefit from better-quality hospital care. First of all, we find that 
education, migrant remittances, and health insurance all play their expected role: education 
increases healthcare access; remitting to the rural family has a negative effect on healthcare 
use; and insurance positively and significantly influences healthcare use. Hence, on the 
sample where we suspect selection to be less of a problem, we obtain the expected 
correlations. 
< Insert Table 8 > 
Table 9 displays the results from Model A. First, education has a negative and 
significant effect on healthcare access. With Model B, we found that education has a positive 
and significant effect on healthcare use. In the light of potential selection, when people have 
health problems, but not very severe ones, the higher the level of education, the more likely it 
is they will return to their hometown. Those who do not leave the city of employment are 
those who are not excluded from the healthcare system for some reason that we have not yet 
                                                      
24
 The results without the NCMS index are unchanged. These are available on request. As noted above, the term 
health insurance is for subscription to health insurance in the city of employment. 
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identified,
25
 or those who cannot leave, possibly for financial reasons or due to a lack of 
family support in the hometown. The term "floating" for migrants is sometimes exaggerated. 
Some no longer have any contact with their hometown. 
< Insert Table 9 > 
Second, remitting has a positive and significant effect on healthcare that was not found 
with Model B. We explain this result as reflecting selection. Migrants who remit are those 
who have contact with their hometown. Therefore, these are the ones who leave the place of 
work when their health is bad enough. This selection effect therefore leads to a sample with 
only a small percentage that has healthcare use and remit. As income plays a strong positive 
role in healthcare use, those who do not have healthcare use are the poorest, whatever the 
level of remittance. 
Health insurance has a significant negative effect on healthcare use. This effect can 
also be viewed as reflecting selection. With Model B, we found a positive effect of health 
insurance. This result suggests that the level of coverage for migrants in the city of 
employment is not enough to allow them to have healthcare use there. Migrants who can 
afford to return to the hometown and who still have contacts in the hometown therefore prefer 
to return to the hometown. 
In addition, Table 5 indicated that the percentage of insured migrants in Dalian is 
about three times that in the other cities, and that mean health expenditures in Dalian are 
about 80 percent higher than those in the other cities. Even so, migrants have less healthcare 
use than in the other cities. To control for any specific Dalian effect, we thus add an 
interaction variable between the index for being a migrant in Dalian and being insured. 
Adding a specific Dalian effect does not change the results. Likewise, all of the models have 
been re-estimated without the observations from Dalian, which did not change the results. 
The selection bias thus appears clearly. Health insurance and education have a 
negative impact on healthcare use, whereas remitting induces greater healthcare use. These 
results are counterintuitive and are opposite those in Model B. In terms of selection bias, 
however, these results make sense. Due to this bias, the sub-sample of migrants with 
healthcare use is composed of those who do not have enough contact with the hometown to 
return there. Therefore, our empirical findings highlight two forms of exclusion: i) exclusion 
for financial reasons -- migrants cannot afford healthcare use or the cost of returning to their 
hometown; ii) the results confirm the hypothesis of exclusion from healthcare use in the city 
of employment for migrants with bad health. 
                                                      
25
 We present the determinants in the next section. 
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Integration into the city 
In Model B, the sample is composed of individuals who have health problems that limit their 
ability to work. Therefore, healthcare use can be interpreted as healthcare access.
26
 We now 
add indices of integration into the city to the model (in Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 8 and 9). 
The survey includes a number of different questions on life conditions. We introduce 
expenditures as life-condition indicators. Specifically, we use clothing, transportation, 
housing, and education expenditures as proxies for life conditions. With respect to education, 
the presence of such expenses means that a child lives with the migrant. In China, the 
majority of migrant children live in the rural area with their grandparents. Apart from 
financial reasons, another consideration is that migrant children have no access to public 
schools due to hukou. Individuals only have access to public services in the town of their 
residency permit. As children only have access to public schools in the place where they are 
registered, migrant children who live with their parents are obliged to attend private schools. 
In addition to the subscription fee, parents have to pay additional fees for not having the right 
hukou. Therefore, education expenses are a good proxy for better life conditions. Likewise, 
spending money on transport says a lot about life conditions. In China, migrants in extreme 
situations do not have houses. They live in tents or prefab housing close to their job. 
Therefore, transportation expenses suggest that migrants live in better conditions. In 
conclusion, education and transportation expenses are proxies for integration into the city. 
In Model B (Table 8), all of the expenses have a positive effect on healthcare access 
except for transportation expenditures. As noted above, migrants with transportation 
expenditures are more likely to have real accommodation rather than a tent or prefab housing 
close to their place of work. However, transportation expenditure necessarily reduces 
migrants' disposable income (going to work leads to transportation expenditures). Controlling 
for income, the type of job, and other types of expenditures, this may explain the negative 
effect. We have also introduced control variables for the type of work contract and ownership 
of durable goods: motorbike, bicycle, VCD/DVD, TV, washing machine, mobile phone, 
microwave or oven, refrigerator, gas stove, and computer. Controlling for social capital and 
expenditures, these new variables have no impact on healthcare access. Moreover, we have 
information on family structure, but this has no effect on migrants' healthcare access either.
27
 
                                                      
26
 Hugh R. Waters, “Measuring equity in access to health care,” art. cit., 2000. 
27
 We do not present the results controlling for "the way in which the migrant obtained their job," family 
structure, and the ownership of durable goods, as none of the estimated coefficients were significant, and their 
inclusion does not change the other results. 
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With respect to the social networks, we apply information on the presence of 
networks, the number of acquaintances or friends, and the way in which the migrant obtained 
her job. Having friends or acquaintances and being in a better socio-economic situation are 
two different phenomena. Friends or acquaintances can provide help in case of worsening 
health. Social networks thus present one reason to remain in the city despite the hukou, a 
legislative incentive to leave, and regardless of the individual's health. Social integration has a 
very significant effect on healthcare access, with a marginal effect of about 60 percent. We 
also find that having friends or acquaintances acts as a significant positive factor in healthcare 
access, with a marginal effect of 67.3 percent. 
On the selected sample, the social network also explains healthcare use. In Model A, 
we find that having friends or acquaintances acts as a significant positive factor in healthcare 
use. This positive and significant effect of social networks is echoed in Model B, where the 
marginal effect is 45 percent. One of the main results of this paper is then the importance of 
the network and social capital on the healthcare access of migrant workers. Networks act as a 
push factor in determining healthcare access and allow migrants to obtain access to healthcare 
regardless of hukou. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper uses data from the Survey of Rural Migrant Workers' Health and Social-economic 
Status in 2006, covering five cities in China: Chongqing, Dalian, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and 
Wuhan. These five cities are among China's most industrialised and with the most rural 
migrant workers. They represent China's five geographical regions with their respective 
economic characteristics. Using this dataset, the results highlight two exclusion factors: a 
financial factor (income) and a social factor (the social networks in the city). We present new 
evidence on the determinants of healthcare use for migrant workers. While financial support 
is one of the key factors, as expected, another is the social network and the feeling of being 
socially integrated. This sheds light on the ability of social networks to tackle exclusion from 
healthcare access. 
Age and being a woman increases the need for healthcare use. The propensity to use 
healthcare is higher for migrants working in state-owned firms. In addition, remitting to the 
rural family has a negative effect on the propensity for healthcare use. Finally, education and 
health insurance contribute to a higher propensity for healthcare use. 
There is no national-level health insurance system in China. The right to healthcare 
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insurance and other benefits depends on a permanent residence registration system, the hukou.  
Individuals are only supposed to claim medical care benefits in the locality where they are 
registered. Migrants are therefore excluded from urban public health insurance and have to 
return to their place of registration in order to take advantage of rural public health insurance. 
Due to these legislative factors, migrants are excluded from healthcare use in their city of 
employment. In addition, in Chinese hospitals, family and relatives play a crucial role during 
treatment, as hospitals provide only a minimum level of accommodation and catering. When 
someone is in hospital, relatives need to be present to support the patient with meals and in 
helping with their treatment, not to mention the psychological impact of family support on 
patient recovery. The presence of relatives is therefore an important factor in how individuals 
recover. Hence, the hukou emphasises both income and the need for family support in 
hospitals as factors pushing migrants to return to their place of registration. However, these 
"push factors" are softened by the organisation of the Chinese health system, in which 
hospital quality varies according to the level of urbanisation, with cities offering the best 
quality of healthcare. Individuals with severe health conditions will have access to adequate 
healthcare quality in a city hospital, so staying in the city may be the best option for these 
migrant workers. In this paper, we thus distinguish two models of healthcare use according to 
the gravity of the health condition. 
As long as migrants do not consider their health problems to be an issue in terms of 
doing their job, they may ignore them. When the gravity of their condition becomes an issue 
for their work, they react. Reacting does not necessarily mean a visit to a doctor in their city 
of employment. As noted above, the hukou acts as a “push” factor on income and the lack of 
social network to exclude them from healthcare use in the city, and they may then return to 
their hometown. As our survey is conducted in the city of employment, migrant workers who 
return to their hometowns do not appear in this survey. This selection bias is apparent in our 
empirical results; migrants who can afford to return to their hometown and who still have 
contacts in their hometown do indeed return there. 
Apart from residency permits and income, we last show that social networks (having 
friends or acquaintances) stand out as a significant determinant of healthcare access. This 
highlights the importance of migrant networks in healthcare access. Feeling socially 
integrated also has a strong positive effect on healthcare access for migrant workers with poor 
health. As such, social integration seems to be a key factor influencing healthcare access. But 
what about those who cannot afford to return to the hometown and those who no longer have 
contact with relatives in their hometown? Should they remain outside the healthcare system in 
 18 
their city of employment without any other options? Targeting this population will allow us to 
define the specificity of this population (the younger tier, the older tier, females?) and to 
establish an adequate healthcare-access policy. 
In this paper, we use data from migrants selected by their work units. These migrants 
have formal jobs and are in a regular and non-critical situation. The study does not cover the 
bottom tier of the migrant population. Our results thus give a much less critical picture than 
the reality. However, even within this rosier picture we have identified some difficult 
situations that indicate implementation of an adequate and efficient health policy as a priority. 
One efficient policy to improve migrants' healthcare access in China would be to focus 
on improving their social integration in the city in which they work. One way is to build up 
migrants' social capital by improving their networks. Resident committees may be the perfect 
vector for such a policy. Resident committees are defined at the neighbourhood level in urban 
areas in China, and are the place where nominated residents manage neighbourhood affairs 
and state-citizen interactions. To data, migrants have not always been well integrated into 
these committees, even if they have a "real" house. Encouraging committees to include 
migrants could therefore be a good way of improving migrants' healthcare access. 
We have shown the importance of integration for migrants' healthcare access. 
However, we have not explained the mechanism behind this result. It would be of interest to 
determine the channel through which integration affects healthcare access: via better 
information, for example? Via interactions with local workers influencing the behaviour of 
migrant workers? It is also important to know whether this integration process affects only 
healthcare access or other domains of life as well, such as children's education.  
Table 1: Gender and age by city 
 
City 
Male Age Total 
% Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
No. Obs. 
Dalian 26.03 24.90 5.29 366 
Shanghai 53.78 31.20 9.29 543 
Wuhan 57.73 28.56 9.05 466 
Shenzhen 45.38 26.36 7.23 498 
Chongqing 51.24 30.85 8.35 525 
Five Cities 48.00 28.65 8.46 2 398 
Source: CASS 2006 Migrants’ survey, 5 cities, 2,398 observations. 
 
Table 2: Education structure 
 
% Dalian Shanghai Wuhan Shenzhen Chongqing Five Cities 
Illiterate 0 2.03 0.43 0.40 1.71 1.00 
Elementary School 1.37 14.55 8.80 9.04 13.14 9.97 
Junior Middle School 54.37 53.59 57.94 63.45 52.57 56.38 
Senior Middle School 12.84 18.05 19.96 16.27 18.48 17.35 
Vocational Middle School 19.95 1.47 2.36 2.81 2.67 5.00 
Technical Middle School 7.38 4.60 8.80 6.63 7.62 6.92 
Junior College 3.83 4.24 1.07 1.00 3.81 2.79 
College 0.27 1.47 0.64 0.20 0 0.54 
Total 366 543 466 498 525 2 398 
Source: see Table 1. 
Table 3: Measuring Health Condition of Migrant Workers 
 
Question Variable format Weight (w) 
Difficulty in raising hand and 
bending in the last month 
Yes/No If yes, w=6; if No, w=0 
Difficulty in walking 1 km in the 
last month 
Yes/No If yes, w=6; if No, w=0 
Difficulty in climbing stairs in the 
last month 
Yes/No If yes, w=6; if No, w=0 
Feeling headache or dizziness often 
in past three months 
Yes/No If yes, w=3; if No, w=0 
Feeling extremely tired in the last 
month 
Yes/No If yes, w=4; if No, w=0 
Feeling stressed in the last month 1
st
 to 6
th
 levels w=0, …, w=5 
 
Table 4: Health Distribution by City 
 
Province p25 p50 p75 p90 Mean Std. Dev. 
Dalian 0 0 4 8 2.2 3.3 
Shanghai 0 0 1 5 1.5 3.6 
Wuhan 0 1 4 9 3.1 4.9 
Shenzhen 0 1 4 8 2.7 4.2 
Chongqing 0 0 3 8 2.4 4.4 
Total 0 0 3 8 2.3 4.2 
Source: See Table 1. 
Note: The index presented here is Health1, Fan's index, from good health (low values) to bad health 
(higher values). 
 
 
Table 5: Healthcare Consumption and Insurance by City 
 
City 
Healthcare Consumption 
Having Health 
Insurance 
(%) 
All sample Insured Not insured 
(%) of 
HCE > 0 
Mean 
HCE 
Std. dev. 
HCE  
(%) of  
HCE > 0 
(%) of  
HCE > 0 
Dalian 41.6 963.9 4 116.2 32.8 44.5 80.0 
Shanghai 63.0 563.6 1 114.8 64.7 57.9 28.2 
Wuhan 60.9 470.5 846.0 63.4 50.8 27.2 
Shenzhen 55.0 493.9 1 088.6 53.5 57.7 14.4 
Chongqing 78.1 515.1 1 405.5 80.4 77.9 18.3 
Total 61.0 560.5 1724.6 63.9 53.9 31.0 
Source: See Table 1. 
Note: HCE: health care expenditure. 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
Variable All sample 
 Mean Std Dev. 
Female 52.0 0.50 
Age (30-40) 30.0 0.46 
Age over 40 12.6 0.33 
Junior School 56.4 0.50 
High School 29.2 0.45 
College 3.3 0.18 
Income 1 434€ 910.80 
Remittance 212€ 263.53 
Health Insurance 33.3 0.47 
NCMS Insurance 21.2 0.41 
Fixed-term contract 54.8 0.76 
Firm size (from 1-small to 3-large) 2.28* 0.26 
Sector Construction  7.2 0,49 
Manufacturing 60.2 0,30 
Ownership State-owned  10.1 0,25 
Collective 6.9 0,43 
Foreign or JV 25.3 0,50 
Expenditure > Q25 
Clothing 22.3 0,42 
Transportation 8.6 0,28 
Education 79.6 0,40 
House 37.3 0,48 
More than 2 acquaintances 79.8 0.40 
Feels socially integrated 55.9 0.50 
Source: See Table 1. 
*Firm size 1 is small, 2 is medium and 3 is large. 
Table 7: Healthcare Consumption for the Whole Sample 
 
 (1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
Probit 
Good/Fair health 0.216** 0.214** 0.232** 0.234** 0.240** 
 (0.0990) (0.0992) (0.0996) (0.0998) (0.105) 
Bad health 0.577*** 0.575*** 0.596*** 0.590*** 0.706*** 
 (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.197) 
Very bad health 0.632*** 0.634*** 0.677*** 0.675*** 0.615** 
 (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) (0.245) (0.251) 
Gender 0.200** 0.197** 0.279*** 0.267*** 0.250** 
 (0.0942) (0.0950) (0.0971) (0.0974) (0.101) 
Age (30-40) 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.371*** 0.356*** 0.345*** 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.115) 
Age over 40 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.504*** 0.475*** 0.452*** 
 (0.153) (0.157) (0.154) (0.158) (0.160) 
Junior School  -0.119  -0.186 -0.174 
  (0.161)  (0.163) (0.165) 
High School  -0.0627  -0.181 -0.149 
  (0.175)  (0.179) (0.183) 
College  0.500  0.272 0.327 
  (0.311)  (0.327) (0.337) 
Log (Income)   0.472*** 0.458*** 0.397*** 
   (0.129) (0.133) (0.140) 
Log (Remittances)     0.0311** 
     (0.0128) 
Health Insurance -0.113 -0.139 -0.175 -0.181 -0.238** 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.114) 
Number of provinces 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: The reference for health status is “Very good health.” Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 8: Healthcare Consumption for Severe Health Conditions (Model B) 
 
 (1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit  
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
Probit 
(6) 
IV model 
Gender 0.543* 0.555* 0.705** 0.848** 0.852** 0.852** 
 (0.318) (0.321) (0.334) (0.352) (0.352) (0.339) 
Age (30-40) 1.271*** 1.292*** 1.220*** 0.905** 0.905** 1.008** 
 (0.364) (0.369) (0.378) (0.428) (0.429) (0.414) 
Age over 40 0.950** 0.983** 0.722 0.874 0.877 1.021** 
 (0.462) (0.464) (0.480) (0.545) (0.544) (0.514) 
Junior school 0.730* 0.805* 0.713 0.536 0.544 0.702 
 (0.436) (0.443) (0.458) (0.488) (0.488) (0.479) 
High school 1.069** 1.032* 1.133** 0.903 0.922 0.939* 
 (0.532) (0.533) (0.551) (0.576) (0.573) (0.561) 
College 1.648 1.324 1.888 1.678 1.671 1.714 
 (1.254) (1.224) (1.271) (1.272) (1.273) (1.277) 
Log (Income) 0.771* 0.755* 0.906** 0.986** 0.996** 0.740 
 (0.403) (0.403) (0.436) (0.467) (0.467) (0.457) 
Log (Remittance) -0.0272 -0.0236 -0.0336 -0.0371 -0.0363 -0.0469 
 (0.0394) (0.0398) (0.0406) (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0414) 
Health Insurance 0.357 0.0620 0.851* 0.913* 0.892* 0.919* 
 (0.393) (0.421) (0.453) (0.478) (0.474) (0.530) 
NCMS   -0.124 -0.130  -0.0702 
   (0.383) (0.410)  (0.384) 
Construction Ind.   0.471 0.546 0.550 0.380 
   (0.695) (0.719) (0.720) (0.687) 
Manufacturing Ind.   -0.186 -0.224 -0.226 0.00424 
   (0.449) (0.479) (0.479) (0.446) 
State-owned ﬁrm   1.311** 1.274** 1.257** 0.797 
   (0.582) (0.588) (0.585) (0.549) 
Collective ﬁrm   0.267 0.292 0.287 0.294 
   (0.599) (0.618) (0.618) (0.573) 
Foreign and JV ﬁrm   -0.622 -0.431 -0.434 -0.657 
   (0.469) (0.493) (0.493) (0.495) 
Fixed-term contract    -0.200 -0.180 -0.315 
    (0.344) (0.338) (0.352) 
Clothing expenditures    0.545 0.551 0.607 
    (0.405) (0.404) (0.390) 
Transport expenditures    -1.628** -1.619** -1.464** 
    (0.783) (0.781) (0.669) 
Education expenditures    0.543 0.542 0.305 
    (0.448) (0.448) (0.432) 
Housing expenditures    0.227 0.224 0.0628 
    (0.329) (0.329) (0.322) 
Acquaintances    0.274 0.262 0.322* 
    (0.410) (0.409) (0.166) 
Feeling socially integrated    0.529* 0.531* 0.473* 
    (0.319) (0.318) (0.256) 
Insurance*Dalian  2.071**     
  (1.041)     
Number of provinces 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: The reference is migrants who are illiterate or with an elementary level of education, working in the 
Service Industry, in a large private Chinese ﬁrm. Within-variation in health status is controlled for with the 
vector of dummy variables for each health question. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The instrumented variable in column (6) is health insurance. 
Table 9: Healthcare Consumption for Bad Health Conditions (Model A) 
 
 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit  
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
Probit 
(6) 
IV model 
Gender 0.229** 0.227** 0.241** 0.146 0.145 0.100 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.113) (0.113) (0.107) 
Age (30-40) 0.233* 0.232* 0.210* 0.00881 0.00905 0.00515 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.137) (0.137) (0.131) 
Age over 40 0.370** 0.370** 0.305* 0.228 0.233 0.327* 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.175) (0.183) (0.183) (0.174) 
Junior school -0.350* -0.351* -0.355** -0.481*** -0.482*** -0.456** 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.181) (0.187) (0.187) (0.179) 
High school -0.344* -0.345* -0.337* -0.461** -0.459** -0.474** 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.206) (0.206) (0.199) 
College 0.133 0.132 0.103 0.0162 0.0160 0.0478 
 (0.356) (0.356) (0.358) (0.364) (0.364) (0.353) 
Log (Income) 0.372** 0.371** 0.329** 0.121 0.118 0.103 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.154) (0.164) (0.164) (0.158) 
Log (Remittance) 0.0385*** 0.0385*** 0.0396*** 0.0494*** 0.0494*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0133) 
Health Insurance -0.308** -0.314** -0.305** -0.338*** -0.336*** -0.133* 
 (0.120) (0.126) (0.125) (0.130) (0.130) (0.076) 
NCMS   0.0958 0.0596  0.00852 
   (0.128) (0.130)  (0.123) 
Construction Ind.   0.472** 0.561** 0.566** 0.622*** 
   (0.218) (0.223) (0.223) (0.220) 
Manufacturing Ind.   0.171 0.161 0.166 0.210 
   (0.151) (0.154) (0.154) (0.146) 
State-owned ﬁrm   0.0239 0.0135 0.0156 -0.0173 
   (0.181) (0.185) (0.185) (0.181) 
Collective ﬁrm   0.192 0.119 0.118 0.115 
   (0.218) (0.222) (0.222) (0.210) 
Foreign and JV ﬁrm   0.107 0.0903 0.0830 -0.102 
   (0.182) (0.186) (0.185) (0.188) 
Fixed-term contract    -0.0655 -0.0668 -0.151 
    (0.117) (0.117) (0.112) 
Clothing expenditures    -0.191 -0.192 -0.214* 
    (0.136) (0.136) (0.128) 
Transport expenditures    -0.503*** -0.506*** -0.460*** 
    (0.187) (0.187) (0.176) 
Education expenditures    -0.461*** -0.458*** -0.417*** 
    (0.152) (0.152) (0.146) 
Housing expenditures    -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.386*** 
    (0.119) (0.119) (0.114) 
Acquaintances    0.380*** 0.384*** 0.372*** 
    (0.133) (0.133) (0.125) 
Feeling socially 
integrated 
   0.0633 0.0614 0.0234 
    (0.111) (0.110) (0.105) 
Insurance*Dalian  0.0654     
  (0.401)     
Number of provinces 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: See Table 8. 
